

LIBRARY
USA CGSC FT LEAVENWORTH, KAN.

OCT 16 1980

ACCESSION NO. _____

PO REGISTR _____ SWISS SECURITY: PERCEPTION OF A SMALL COUNTRY (u)

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

FRANZ LOETSCHER, SWITZERLAND
MILITAERSCHULE, FEDERAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
ZURICH, 1968

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1980

19981016 035

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

15 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR Security Office, ATTN: Helen Stewart

SUBJECT: MMAS Thesis Review Completion

1. The following theses have recently been reviewed by subject matter experts. It has been determined that the FOUO and proprietary restrictions no longer apply and the documents should be releasable to the public. Therefore distribution statements should be changed to Distribution A.

Title: Securing Land Lines of Communication in Insurgent War--A Proposed Doctrine

Publication Date: 1969

Author: MAJ Dale R. Sweetwood

Title: U.S. Air Force Rated Retention Problem: An Analysis Through the Tactical Air Command
Aircrew Concerns Report

Publication Date: 1980

Author: MAJ James E. Little

Title: Swiss Security: Perception of a Small Country

Publication Date: 1980

Author: MAJ Franz Loetscher

3. POC is Karin Brightwell, 4-2741.



PHILIP J. BROOKES
Director
Graduate Degree Programs

ATZL-GCJ-S (ATZL-SWD-GD) (385)
SUBJECT: MMAS Thesis Review Completion

1st End HStewart/4-3687

Security Division, PMO

21 September 1998

FOR USACGSC, Director, Graduate Degree Programs

1. Security Division recommends:

Approval ☒Disapproval ☐2. POC is undesignated at 4-3687.

HELEN STEWART
Security Section
PMO

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 16 May 1980		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis Aug 79 - May 80	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Swiss security: perceptions of a small country				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Loetscher, Franz					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 1 Reynolds Ave., Bldg. 111, Rm. 123 Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
<p>13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)</p> <p>This study examines the dilemma of a traditional neutral country between independence and interdependence. The Swiss perception of seeing themselves as a "special case" is discussed in terms of Swiss federalism, land of minorities and sense for compromise, economic dependence and neutrality.</p> <p>Swiss Security Policy is confronted in a case study with the scenarios of General Sir John Hackett's The Third World War and General Robert Close's Europe Without Defense. In a worsening international situation, possible Swiss security assessments, options, and methods of crisis management are discussed in order to analyze the question of the feasibility of the policy of neutrality in a future war.</p> <p>In the final conclusions, it is anticipated that the concepts of Swiss neutrality and security are still the best option for a small state. Several constraints are discussed that force the Swiss to adapt their policy to the current world situation: economic interweaving, new forms of international threats, and, the problems of sophisticated military technology for a militia army. Finally, recommendations concerning Switzerland and the United Nations, developing aid, and defense spending are made.</p>					
14. SUBJECT TERMS Switzerland Defense policy				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 94	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate Franz Loetscher, Switzerland

Title of thesis Swiss Security: Perception of a Small Country (u)

Approved by:

Ernest J. Webb, Thesis Committee Chairman

Marion J. Johnston LTC USA, Member, Graduate Faculty

Bruce W. Manning, Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 16th day of May 1980 by Philip J. Brookes,
Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

ABSTRACT

SWISS SECURITY: PERCEPTION OF A SMALL COUNTRY⁽¹⁾ by Franz Loetscher, Switzerland, 88 pages.

This study examines the dilemma of a traditional neutral country between independence and interdependence. The Swiss perception of seeing themselves as a "special case" is discussed in terms of Swiss federalism, land of minorities and sense for compromise, economic dependence and neutrality.

Swiss Security Policy is confronted in a case study with the scenarios of General Sir John Hackett's The Third World War and General Robert Close's Europe Without Defense. In a worsening international situation, possible Swiss security assessments, options, and methods of crisis management are discussed in order to analyze the question of the feasibility of the policy of neutrality in a future war.

In the final conclusions, it is anticipated that the concepts of Swiss neutrality and security are still the best option for a small state. Several constraints are discussed that force the Swiss to adapt their policy to the current world situation: economic interweaving, new forms of international threats, and, the problems of sophisticated military technology for a militia army. Finally, recommendations concerning Switzerland and the United Nations, developing aid, and defense spending are made.

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL - USE ONLY~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
I	INTRODUCTION	1
II	THE SWISS SPECIAL CASE	7
	Swiss Federalism	7
	Minorities and Sense for Compromise	9
	Economic Dependence	11
	Summary	16
III	SWISS SECURITY	20
	Goals	23
	Instruments	24
	Strategic Cases	24
	Summary	28
IV	FROM THE STATE OF RELATIVE PEACE TO THE CRISIS-CASE . .	30
	General Defense in the State of Relative Peace (Normal Case)	31
	State of Increased Tensions or Serious Disorders (Crisis Case)	41
V	FROM OPEN CONFLICTS IN EUROPE TO MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SWITZERLAND	50
	Open Conflicts in Europe (Neutrality Protection Case)	50
	Occupation of Parts of the Country (Occupation Case)	69
	Summary	71

Chapter	Page
VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	74
APPENDIX: Switzerland's Force Structure	84
BIBLIOGRAPHY	86

[REDACTED]

List of Maps

Maps		Page
1	Ethnic Groups, Languages	10
2	General Sir John Hackett: Warsaw Pact Thrust Lines (as planned) From "The Third World War"	51
3	Ibid; Situation, 1800 hours, 12 August	52
4	Bombings of Switzerland During World War II: 1939-1945 . . .	54
5	The Alpine Barrier of Switzerland and Austria	57
6	Geophysical Regions of Switzerland	58
7/8	Interest of Switzerland's Neutral Territory for Warsaw Pact and NATO	60
9/10	Zones of the Swiss Army Corps	62
11	Operation Through Switzerland Against NATO Center's Flank . .	66

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In my discussions of international politics with a broad cross section of Americans one of the more common questions addressed to me is "Why are you Swiss still neutral?" Many Americans then answer their own question by saying, "Switzerland, a western oriented democracy, has no real choice; your economy is based on the free market system, and your security depends, whether you like it or not, on NATO's nuclear umbrella over aligned, nonaligned and neutral Europe."¹ From the perspective of a superpower, these observations possess a certain validity. The average American is well aware of his country's commitment to a free western world. From this sense of commitment there follows a tendency to divide the world into "friends" and "enemies." What many Americans lack is a sense of perspective. A small central European country like Switzerland has to use a much smaller and very different set of references and scale of commitments to survive and prosper in peace and independence in a divided world.

The idea of avoiding foreign conflicts is not a recent phenomenon in Swiss foreign politics. Swiss neutrality evolved along with the European balance of power system, and the roots of neutrality reach back to the fifteenth century.² Earlier, during the fourteenth and fifteenth century Swiss military power had been a dominant factor in central Europe. Early Swiss militia armies employed revolutionary

tactics to defeat the proud "knights" of the Hapsburgs, to destroy rich Burgundy (a fast-developing state between what evolved into France and Germany), and to gain formal Swiss independence from the Holy Roman Empire. But the era of military power was short-lived, ending in 1515 at the battle of Marignano, in which the French used effective artillery to defeat the Swiss infantry decisively. Because of the good reputation of the Swiss soldier, Switzerland became Europe's supplier for military manpower. Under the regulation of official treaties between the Federal Diet and emerging European powers (especially France), Swiss mercenaries participated in almost every battle of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Swiss neutrality was in the interest of all parties: the Federal Diet allowed Swiss troops to serve under different colors, and the European powers benefited from the services of hotheaded Swiss warriors who fought everyone else's battles except their own.³ The period of neutrality for convenience drew to an end with the rise of Napoleon and the fall of the European balance of power system. Napoleon had no interest in a neutral Switzerland because the alpine crossroads, north-south and east-west, were vital to his campaigns. So he subdued a weakly-defended Switzerland in 1798, and Switzerland remained more or less a French satellite for the rest of the Napoleonic era.

In 1815, the Congress of Vienna restored the European balance of power, in part by confirming the "everlasting neutrality" of Switzerland. The great powers supported a neutral Switzerland as a stabilizing element in the key strategic area of the central Alps. Since 1815,

Switzerland has avoided all European military conflicts. It was in this period, that the traditional, world-wide acknowledged Swiss neutrality policy developed. The world wars of the twentieth century left Switzerland undamaged. There can be no doubt: neutrality has served the country well. Only a significant change within the European political system could cause the Swiss to abandon neutrality as a sound foreign policy.

However, neutral status does not mean that Switzerland can ignore larger issues associated with international politics. One of these is the predicament created by the seemingly paradoxical requirements of independence and growing international interdependence. Another issue since the end of the "Cold War" in the early sixties has been the pace of fastmoving political change. The world has evolved from a mainly bi-polar confrontation between East and West to a complex, highly vulnerable, and interdependent multi-polar field of variable forces.

The most important strategic changes Switzerland will face in the 1980's can be summarized as follows:

1. For the first time in the nuclear age NATO will be outnumbered in Europe by the Warsaw Pact in a decisive way, both in conventional and nuclear capabilities.⁴ Therefore the Soviets will probably gain more political and military freedom to act in their national interest.

Switzerland and Austria together form a 850 kilometer long alpine-mountain barrier extending from the Iron curtain to

the southeastern flank of France and separating NATO Center from NATO South. The shifting military strength between NATO and the Warsaw Pact may have an impact on this area.

2. Lesser developed countries control vital raw material. Access to energy, especially oil, will be a major political consideration for industrialized countries. Tensions between the rich countries in the north and the developing countries in the south, can become a factor of instability.
3. International political, economic, and military interdependence will further increase. Therefore single states can be affected by local conflicts in distant areas.
4. In the realm of military technology the trend towards expensive, highly sophisticated weapon systems will continue. Small countries will have to decide to what extent they are able to participate in the "arms race."

The hypothesis of this study is, that a small country like Switzerland retains a respectable freedom of action in spite of the interdependence of today's world. According to the Federal Constitution the main purpose of the Swiss Confederation is freedom in independence.⁵ Independence is a function of continuing peace and stability in Europe. Therefore, the aim of Swiss security policy is to prevent war. Neutrality together with a credible defense capability is still the best way to stay free in independence. Neutrality, however, has to be understood as an active policy that does not mean abstention

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

from participation in world affairs in general, especially economic integration and international solidarity.

Several assumptions are implicit in this study. Those assumptions are that:

- Both superpowers seek to avoid direct confrontations, especially nuclear war.
- The U.S. Government has perceived the military weakness in Europe. Any possible steps to remedy the situation will take several years to be effective.
- European political and economic cooperation will grow. However, there will be no "United Europe" in the political sense.

At the same time, this study acknowledges limitations. Emphasis will fall upon the strategic aspect of Swiss neutrality and consequently on Swiss security policy with all its implications. The following subjects will not be treated in detail:

- The economic situation of Switzerland.
 - The humanitarian tradition (i.e., Red Cross, etc.).
 - The role as international mediator and sanctuary for refugees.
- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES

¹Harold C. Deutsch, Alignment and Neutrality: Europe's Future. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 5 May 1978.

²Edgar Bonjour, Swiss Neutrality: It's History and Meaning. London, 1946.

³Ibid.

⁴John M. Collins and Anthony H. Cordesman, Imbalance of Power, Shifting U.S.-Soviet Military Strengths, San Rafael, 1978.

⁵The Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation. (Unofficial translation).

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER II
THE SWISS SPECIAL CASE

Why do the Swiss see their state as a special case within the community of countries? In order to understand the Swiss outlook, we must understand the concept of democracy, a single but important stone in the rich mosaic that constitutes the state of Switzerland. The following discussion centers on four characteristics of the Swiss State:

- federalism, the Swiss way of democracy and self-determination,
- respect for minorities, the Swiss sense for compromise,
- the economic dependence,
- the Swiss perception of neutrality.

Swiss federalism

The basic building block of Swiss democracy is the local village or town which traditionally retains a high degree of autonomy. With the exception of some larger towns in which a parliamentary-type system governs, in most communities the citizens meet several times a year to approve or disapprove decisions of the elected community council and to give guidance for further action. The following list conveys an impression of the amount of direct influence the single-citizen possesses in community affairs:

- approval of the community account to discharge the community council,

- approval of the yearly community budget and determination of the tax level for community affairs,
- initiation and evaluation of community projects exceeding a certain amount of money. Up to a rather low amount, the community council can decide on its own,
- and election of members of the community council, various kinds of commissions, local judges, schoolteachers.

The Swiss referendum democracy works on three levels: the village or town as discussed, the canton, and the federal.¹ Each level of the democratic process involves the citizen accordingly. In contrast with other western democracies, the Swiss citizen not only elects democratic representatives on every level for the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, but also decides taxes and expenses. With enough support in the form of signatures of fellow citizens anyone can initiate, change, or defeat amendments to the federal or cantonal constitutions and laws.² Even in foreign policy, which lies in the realm of federal competence, important bilateral or multilateral treaties are subject to referendum. The Swiss concept of the executive and legislative branches further emphasizes the concept of direct democracy. The federal council, the cantonal councils, and the communal councils are each collectively responsible for their decisions. At the federal and cantonal level the president of the council changes every year even though he has only a representative function. This system of collective responsibility has proven remarkably stable. Since 1848, when the constitution for the Confederation was introduced, the government has never suffered a crisis of confidence. Furthermore, neither

the Federal Assembly nor the cantonal parliaments are fulltime bodies. Members of the Federal Assembly meet four times a year for a few weeks at a time and in emergencies. Otherwise, they continue their own businesses or jobs in direct contact with the people who elected them.


Minorities and sense for compromise

An important characteristic of Switzerland is the linguistic, cultural, and confessional variety of the country. Within an environment of diversity, only the Swiss sense of compromise keeps the country together. An early example of compromise occurred in 1529 during the reformation, when a Protestant army under Zurich's reformer, Ulrich Zwingli met a Catholic army from the central cantons in Kappel south of Zurich. Instead of fighting for what they believed was right, they decided to discuss the matter. The Catholics contributed milk and Protestants the bread, and all sat together and made peace while eating the famous "milk-soup of Kappel."³ In the spirit of compromise, Switzerland accepts four equal official languages:⁴

- German in eastern and central Switzerland (64.9 percent of the population).
- French in western Switzerland (18.1 percent of the population).
- Italian in southern Switzerland (11.9 percent of the population).
- Romansh, a latin dialect in the Grisons (0.8 percent of the population).

Ethnic Groups, Languages

- 1 German
- 2 French
- 3 Italian
- 4 Romansh



MAP 1

The decentralized, federal structure of the country allows every canton to have its own culture according to local heritage. Since the Swiss Confederation is a marriage of reason rather than a love affair among the cantons, language or other minority problems can usually be solved by consensus.

The history of compromise has seen some anxious moments. One was the so called ditch between German and French speaking Swiss at the

outbreak of World War I. Sympathies and emotions were divided between Germany and France according to cultural heritage. Finally, however, with the help of strong words from the Swiss Nobel prize winner Carl Spitteler, in "Our Swiss Standpoint", reason prevailed in the interest of peace, independence, and traditional neutrality.⁵ The atrocities of World War I, the mobilization of a multi-lingual Swiss army and the national will to stay out of war, aroused a common spirit of patriotism. Since then the language problem has never again been an issue on the national level. In 1979, an inter-cantonal language problem was solved when the Roman-Catholic part of French-speaking Jura became independent from the Bern Canton in accordance with democratic procedure. Subsequently, Jura became the 25th Canton of the Swiss Confederation.

Economic dependence

The third important element to note is the almost complete economic dependence of Switzerland on foreign raw material, free international trade, and tourism. As a country poor in raw materials, Switzerland has depended since earliest times on economic exchange with foreign countries. Earlier the main Swiss export was manpower in the form of a well-organized and state-controlled system of mercenaries in foreign armies but during the nineteenth century an efficient export industry developed.⁶ Because of the lack of raw materials, the main exports by the middle of the nineteenth century included finished products, sophisticated technology, and money which had accumulated during the long prosperous peacetime. Today, Switzerland with its 6.3 million

inhabitants has expanded its economic importance to a volume comparable with countries of larger populations. The following listing gives an idea of the importance of Switzerland in various categories within the World Community of about 140 nations:

Switzerland: A Strong Small State

A worldwide comparison compiled in 1971

Territory	rank	112
Population	rank	67
Defense spending	rank	28
Gross national product	rank	23
Education spending	rank	22
Exchanged Diplomats	rank	22
Manpower occupied in research	rank	17
Exports	rank	12
Imports	rank	11
Scientific publications	rank	11
Computers	rank	10
Scientific magazines	rank	9
Diplomatic representations	rank	9
Monetary reserves	rank	6
Living standard	rank	6
Investments in foreign countries	rank	5
International Organizations	rank	5
Defence forces in relation to population	rank	1

Source: Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, p. 34, Paul Haupt Berne, 1975.

Since 1971 these figures have been subject to some changes: In an increased community of 160 nations Switzerland, for example, ranked third or fourth in 1979 for investments in foreign countries (equal to the Federal Republic of Germany). While further the monetary reserves were growing, defense spending was decreasing. As we can see, the mainstay of Swiss prosperity is still manpower in the form of human knowhow. However, the overexpanded Swiss economy needs free economic exchange. Therefore, Switzerland signed a Free Trade Treaty with the European Community in 1972.⁷ Full membership was rejected in Switzerland because of the incompatibility of traditional Swiss neutrality with the political goals of the European Community to develop a united Europe.

This in turn raises the question, how do the Swiss perceive their neutrality and its impact on European security? The term "neutral" causes misunderstanding and misinterpretation because it is often not properly applied. The U.S. Government, for example, declared itself neutral in its initial response to the outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967. More recently (1977), Ambassador Andrew Young reasoned that the U.S. had to be neutral in the question of Israeli settlements on the West Bank because of the American role as mediator. Since the U.S. is Israel's main supplier of arms, the term neutral as defined by international law does not apply. What the U.S. was trying to say, in both cases, was that she did not support a specific party in the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁸

Many Swiss do not understand the legal meaning of their own neutrality. For example, the famous Swiss writer Max Frisch wrote in 1968 at the climax of the Vietnam War:

"Switzerland as a state is neutral. We know it, but it is necessary that it is repeated again and again because it is wrong. The fact that Switzerland abstains from taking part officially in international conflicts does not conceal that she is integrated into the U.S. hegemony. Her neutrality (today) is the correct silence of a vassal. How could Switzerland, a U.S. dominated enclave, behave differently than "neutral"?⁹

Max Frisch evidently confused the term neutral as rooted in international law since the early twentieth century with the concept of neutrality of conscience which is something very different. Moreover, neutrality is more than just an opportunistic attitude of a country. International law defines it as nonparticipation in wars of other states. Laws of neutrality are codified in several international treaties.¹⁰ The duties of a neutral state in wartime are:

- to abstain from support of war parties with armed forces, governmental armament aid, governmental credits for war purposes, and transmission of military intelligence.
- to prevent violations of its neutrality with all possible means.
- to tolerate certain controls of the war parties, as for example, the control of neutral ships on the open sea.
- to treat the war parties impartially in matters of governmental regulations for exports and through traffic of war material.

~~TOP SECRET~~

While occasional neutral states have no further obligations in peacetime, permanent neutral states such as Switzerland and Austria have to abstain from aggression and alliances, and must be prepared to defend their neutral territorium.¹¹

Let us return to Max Frisch's statement. In the case of Vietnam, Switzerland did not violate any of her duties resulting from perpetual neutrality. Max Frisch, of course, did not appreciate the legal aspects of neutrality. He emphasized neutrality of conscience, which is the problem of each individual without regard to the official position of the government. Switzerland is a free democracy, strongly dedicated to the western way of life. The Swiss reject any form of totalitarian government or ideological browbeating. The desire to avoid war and to observe the international duties of a permanent neutral country does not mean that the individual cannot have opinions on world affairs and exercise freedom of speech to make those views public. The Swiss normally react gravely to cases of injustice or aggression, especially if small countries are involved. So, Switzerland boycotted the Olympics in Melbourne after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. But it is not the prerogative of government to give official advice in such matters. Ideally, these are grassroots movements. While the law of neutrality provides the framework of rights and duties for the neutral state, the policy chosen to secure neutrality differs from state to state. Sweden defines her neutrality as freedom of alliance aimed at avoiding war. Austria's neutrality, although officially patterned after the example of Switzerland, is

~~TOP SECRET~~

handled differently in many respects. The neutrality policy of Sweden and Austria is characterized by an active participation in international peacekeeping within the framework of the United Nations. Finland's neutrality has the same purpose as that of Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland, but is constrained by the close proximity of the Soviet Union and strategical territory located on the northern flank of NATO. Yugoslavia has become the pattern for many developing countries with her policy of neutralism or nonalignment. Contrary to the legally defined concept of neutrality, neutralism is a purely political attitude that can be abandoned anytime. It is aimed mainly to resist dependency on the two superpowers and does not apply in all armed conflicts.¹²

Summary

Sentiment for cooperative democracy¹³ is deeply rooted within the Swiss population and has, therefore, to be considered a major factor in every strategic assessment. The advantages of the system are impressive: political stability and maximum citizen participation form an unbeatable combination favoring prosperity.

However, there are also important disadvantages. The democratic process takes time, sometimes too much time. In addition, the problems of an industrialized country are very complex, it will become more difficult for nonspecialists to decide crucial issues. Decreasing participation on voting days is perhaps indicative of the difficulty.

In summary we can say that there is a strong isolationist element in Swiss domestic politics that arises from the necessity to

protect the complicated democratic and balanced structure of the country. One logical consequence is traditional everlasting neutrality. In sharp contrast the Swiss economy, by necessity, has remained externally oriented, open to the world and, therefore, highly sensitive to fluctuations in the world economy. For these reasons, Switzerland faces a dilemma: on the one hand there is a need for increasing adaptation to international interdependence, and on the other hand there is a traditional desire to refrain from external political commitment to retain maximum independence.¹⁴

To understand the Swiss political mentality and associated values it is essential to consider the factors discussed in this chapter as they relate to one another. Switzerland is not a nation in the classical sense; she is better described as a federation of minorities that have learned in a long historical process how to retain a balanced diversity while living in domestic peace. At the same time, life on the cultural and economic crossroads of Europe has meant that the Swiss traditionally are very much interested and engaged in world affairs. One important reason for the development of a national concept of neutrality has been the sheer impossibility of forcing the individual Swiss citizen into a neutrality of conscience. The variety of opinions, standpoints, and emotions of every individual regarding world affairs, threatened at times to tear the country apart, and some positions stood in obvious contrast to the official policy of neutrality. The Swiss are convinced that their example of living together in a spirit of toleration could solve many of the conflicts of the world

and could certainly be a model for the unification of Europe. Since it would be contrary to the Swiss philosophy to promote this idea by other means than persuasion, the concept of neutrality is, logically, the only reasonable attitude for the state. It is this tension between individual engagement and concern and collective self-restriction which makes Switzerland a special case: a way of life for minorities and an international sanctuary of peace.

CHAPTER II

ENDNOTES

¹One of the major problems for the Federal Council is the adaptation of the responsibilities of Confederation and Cantons according to today's needs. Richtlinien der Regierungspolitik 1975-1979 (1976), p. 24.

²Agathe Salmen, Schweizer Almanach 79, (New York: Transbooks, Inc., 1978), p. 7.

³Georg Thuerer, Bundesspiegel, (Ex Libris, Zurich, 1964), p. 47.

⁴_____, Swiss economic data 1979, Credit Suisse, 1979.

⁵Edgar Bonjour, Swiss Neutrality: It's History and Meaning, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1946), p. 107.

⁶Hans Christoph Binswanger, Schweizerische Staatsidee und Aussenpolitik in Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, (Paul Haupt, Bern 1975), p. 141-142.

⁷Alois Riklin and Willy Zeller, Verhaeltnis der Schweiz zu den Europaeischen Gemeinschaften in Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik (Paul Haupt, Bern 1975), p. 451.

⁸Alois Riklin, Ist Neutralitaet noch zeitgemass?, in Wende in unserer Sicherheitspolitik, Athenaeum Verlag, Lugano, 1978, p. 44.

⁹Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁰See 2. Peace Conference of The Hague, 18 October 1907.

¹¹Alois Riklin, p. 45.

¹²Dietrich Schindler, Dauernde Neutralitaet in Handbuch der Schweiz Aussenpolitik, p. 165.

¹³Hans Christoph Binswanger, Schweizerische Staatsidee und Aussenpolitik in Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, (Paul Haupt, Bern 1975), p. 143.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 139 ff.

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER III
SWISS SECURITY

It is a sign of today's complex international relations that the term security is often equated with the terms defense and deterrence.¹ However, military power is just one aspect of security, an aspect of decreasing importance in the view of some observers. The security considerations of any country focuses increasingly on economic matters. For example, recent history indicates that the heavy dependency of the industrialized world on middle east oil can not be secured by military power alone.

The super powers are to a certain extent prisoners of their own arsenal, which is of such devastating effect that neither side can afford a direct military confrontation. Because of this mutual military neutralization, the continuing struggle for influence has devolved into a gray zone, one in which third parties possess a limited freedom of action.²

The military stalemate is nowhere so evident as in central Europe, where the largest military arsenal in the history of mankind is concentrated. For the sake of argument in this chapter, we will assume that the accumulated military potential on both sides of the iron curtain continues to be a effective deterrant to the outbreak of military conflict in this region. The shifting balance of power in Europe and the possible impact of distant crises on western Europe will be discussed in a later chapter.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Switzerland's security has always depended to a high degree on the balance of power in Europe.³ The neutral small state finds the best living conditions within a system of balanced power in which the competing powers restrain each other. The resulting grey zone, as mentioned before, provides a certain freedom of action even for small states. The emergency of the two Superpowers after World War II and their continued presence in Europe, together with the common nuclear threat and the rise of lesser developed countries controlling important raw materials, have rendered obsolete the conventional concept of balance of power. These changes have also enlarged the frame of reference for Swiss security from a merely European to a Global dimension. To complicate the situation, the end of the Cold War during the 1960's caused an intensive discussion of strategy in Switzerland.

Military publicists like Gustav Daeniker supported the development of Swiss nuclear weapons, arguing that the only answer to nuclear blackmail and overwhelming military threat was nuclear retaliation.⁴ In 1967, the Swiss Defense Minister Nello Celio created a commission for strategic studies to develop a comprehensive strategic conception for Switzerland. In its report of 1969, the commission did not recommend the creation of a Swiss nuclear force and instead laid emphasis on further development of conventional forces. The reasoning was that the employment of nuclear weapons would not be appropriate for Switzerland because of their devastating effect in a small country. Therefore, every effort should be made to keep the nuclear threshold as high as possible.⁵

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In spite of these conclusions Switzerland did not ratify the non-proliferation treaty of July 1, 1969. To retain the freedom of action, Switzerland emphasized a desire to ratify the treaty only when the major European powers had ratified it.⁶

The "Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the security policy of Switzerland of June 27, 1973," introduced for the first time a concept of general defense including "the comprehensive use of all our civil and military means against all threats (subversion, terror, abuse of power, blackmail, direct and indirect attacks, effects of acts of war or warlike acts abroad)."⁷

Article 2 of the Swiss Constitution provided the base for the new security policy: "The purpose of the Confederation is the preservation of the country's independence, the maintenance of internal peace and order, the protection of the freedom and rights of the citizens, and the furtherance of their general welfare."⁸ Security can be defined as all actions of the state to preserve peace in independence, to protect the population, and to defend the territory. Short definitions like peace or independence often require further elaboration.⁹ The limitations imposed by the international situation on the peace and independence of a small country will be discussed in a later chapter.

Swiss national interests can be derived from the Swiss conception of state as outlined in chapter two. The objective is, of course, to preserve freedom in independence or, more specifically, to retain external and internal freedom of action to be able to take adequate measures to protect Swiss national interests in a case of emergency.

[REDACTED]

It is the goal of Swiss security policy to prevent:

- a. the necessity of giving in to political or economic pressure because of internal weakness.
- b. the country from suffering the effects of foreign armed conflicts.
- c. terror from disturbing or interrupting the process of peaceful and democratic domestic evolution.
- d. a foreign occupier from forcing her will upon Switzerland.
- e. population casualties so heavy that the country is destroyed.

The instruments and policies available to give the government the capability to act in the interest of national security depend on the forms of threat that face a western country today. These threats are well known and shall be discussed in detail in later chapters:

- a. The state of relative peace.
- b. Indirect warfare.
- c. Conventional war.
- d. War with the employment of weapons of mass destruction.
- e. Blackmail.

To understand Swiss security policy we will review four instruments of particular importance: the armed forces, foreign policy, civil defense, and war economy preparations.

The Armed Forces

Traditionally the most visible instrument of security is the Swiss Army. Its mission is to prevent war by defense readiness.¹¹ This goal can only be reached if the Army demonstrates its capacity to conduct a long and obstinate war to defend Swiss territory. Every potential enemy should know that the price of entry into Switzerland will far exceed the benefits of conquest.¹²

As long as the balance of power is intact, neutral states are generally respected. However, the examples of Belgium in 1940 and, more recently, Lebanon show that the territorium of a neutral or non-aligned state can become increasingly important in a changing balance of power system.¹² To avoid a territorial power vacuum, which has to be filled by one of the committed powers, the neutral state needs an adequate defense force and the will to use it in a case of emergency. The Swiss Army is a thoroughly organized and well-trained militia. The mobilization of 620,000 men is possible within 24-48 hours.¹⁴

Foreign Policy

The increasing momentum of the arms race and the growing technological gap between the armed forces of the Superpowers and the smaller powers increase the interest of the latter in international peacekeeping and developing techniques to resolve conflicts.¹⁵ Foreign policy has always been an important instrument of security policy. Many Swiss think that the country's foreign policy assumes a more active and inventive role in peacekeeping and collective

security. A recent example of this impulse was active Swiss participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Within the United Nations Switzerland participates in most of the sub-organizations but is still not a full member. Encouraged by the positive experience of other neutral states like Austria and Sweden, the Swiss Federal Council has declared its will to attain full membership as soon as possible. However, since a federal vote is necessary, and since the general mood of the people is still not clearly favorable, the issue is still open.

Civil Defense

Since the era of World War II active hostilities have imposed increasingly higher losses on civilian populations. Therefore, preventive measures to shelter civilians assumes greater importance as an instrument of security policy. The purpose of civil defense is to back the government in the case of nuclear blackmail and to keep losses low during a military conflict. The Swiss Civil Defense Concept 1971, the fundamental law for the Civil Defense Organization, aims at providing every citizen with an adequate and livable shelter.¹⁶ The Civil Defense Organization consists of about 500,000 men and women who are not drafted into the Swiss Armed Forces. The organization's mission is to prepare for the protection of the civil population and to assist in case of damage. Manpower is recruited locally and is strictly separated from the Armed Forces according to the requirements of the Geneva Convention.

War Economy Preparations

Except for the River Rhine, Switzerland has no access to the open sea, and as already explained, depends heavily on imports. It is therefore of vital interest for Switzerland to keep significant reserves of vital raw materials and other goods. Either to overcome geographical isolation or to support military defense for an adequate amount of time. During World War II, Switzerland survived from 1940 to 1944 in a state of isolation. The government subsidizes a program obliging private import companies to keep defined quantities of their imports of vital goods as stocks reserved for war-time. The combat service support concept of the Army relies on stockpiling sufficient resources in peacetime to fight a long war without access to imports. This sophisticated and expensive system of stockpiling vital goods in peacetime shows the total national commitment to security policy better than any other measure.

The Federal Council on the security policy of Switzerland has stated that "the capacity to institute and maintain a state of readiness appropriate to the particular situation or threat at the right time" is paramount.¹⁸ One important aspect of Swiss security policy is, therefore, the government's ability to assure flexible reaction in case of national emergency.

To facilitate decision-making and crisis management, the Federal Council identifies six strategic cases:¹⁹

- | | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| 1. normal case | = state of relative peace |
| 2. crisis case | = state of increased tension or serious disorders |
| 3. neutrality protection case | = open conflicts in Europe |
| 4. defense case | = military operations against Switzerland |
| 5. catastrophe case | = events resulting in great damages |
| 6. occupation case | = occupation of parts of the country |

It is assumed that these cases can occur separately or in combination. For each of these cases the Federal Council is ready to implement prepared "packages of measures" to meet the various challenges possible. The Swiss security effort represents a dynamic system ranging from long term peacekeeping efforts to armed defense.

The instruments available for the implementation of Swiss security policy fulfill external active functions meant to insure security by contributing to a real and lasting peace as well as to defensive functions consisting of all kinds of measures and precautions to prevent or counter actions aimed at Swiss security interests.

The strategic instruments mentioned in the Report of the Federal Council can be divided into three areas:²⁰

- a. foreign policy
- b. armed forces
- c. the civilian area, including civil defense, economy and finance, information, psychological defense, and security of state.

In summary, we can say that Swiss security policy is an integrated concept of long and short-term crisis-prevention and crisis-management. The following chart shows the system in its context:

<u>Strategic Case</u>	<u>Strategic Goal</u>	<u>Strategic Instruments</u>	<u>Strategic Missions</u>
Normal	self-maintenance	foreign policy armed forces civil defense war economy preparations information psychological defense	sufficient security-preparations/measures
crisis	security of peace crisis-management	security of state	reduction of tensions solve conflicts without violence
neutrality-protection	dissuasion: Keep out of war by defense readiness	coordinated infrastructure for combat and survival	encounter violations of neutrality secure flow of supply for the country
defense	fight the war	armed forces civil defense war economy coordinated services for army and civilians foreign policy	struggle for sovereignty
catastrophe	reduce damage secure survival	civil defense coordinated services army	protection salvage repair damage
occupation	resistance in occupied territory	parts of army and civilians	armed and unarmed resistance

Source: Sicherheitspolitik und Armee, Eine Dokumentation, Verlag Huber Frauenfeld 1976, p. 40-41.

Does the concept of Swiss security policy work if we confront it with hypothetical challenges in the form of various scenarios? This will be the subject of the next chapters.

CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES

¹Curt Gasteyger, Sicherheitspolitik in Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik (Paul Haupt, Bern 1975), p. 197.

²Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr, Oran R. Young, Neutralization and World Politics (Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 11.

³Curt Gasteyger, Ibid, p. 199.

⁴Custav Daeniker, Strategie des Kleinstaats (Verlag Huber, Frauenfeld/Stuttgart, 1966).

⁵SAD, Grundlagen einer strategischen Konzeption der Schweiz, Schriften des SAD 11, 1971, p. 101 ff.

⁶Curt Gasteyger, Ibid., p. 207.

⁷Zentralstelle fuer Gesamtverteidigung, General defense, 1976, p. 5.

⁸Federal Constitution (unofficial translation), p. 4.

⁹Curt Gasteyger, p. 213.

¹⁰General defense, p. 21 ff.

¹¹Ibid., p. 19.

¹²Hans Senn, Korpskommandant, Kann die Armee ihren Auftrag erfuellen? (Beilage zur ASMZ Nr 3/1979), p. 15.

¹³Neutralization and World Politics, p. 24 ff.

¹⁴International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1979-1980, London: Bartholomew Press, 1979.

¹⁵Curt Gasteyger, Ibid., p. 213.

¹⁶Horst Niederhausen, Territorial Defense in NATO and Non-NATO Europe (Rand Corp AD-770 609, February 1973), p. 81 ff.

CHAPTER IV

FROM THE STATE OF RELATIVE PEACE TO THE CRISIS-CASE

The case studies within chapters 4 and 5 expand on the current world situations and on the scenarios of General Hacketts's Third World War¹ and General Close's Europe Without Defense.² Both scenarios were designed to provoke discussion over Europe's defense. The authors created situations in which the western concept of flexible response did not fully work. Various assumptions, of course, are always subject to criticism. However, we must remember that one objective of war-gaming is to provoke new ideas. Therefore, it is necessary to create unexpected situations. Both scenarios fulfill this condition.

The purpose of these chapters is to demonstrate the extent to which Swiss security policy might work in case of crises and threat. The Swiss estimates and options formulated for case study are as far as possible based on official documents and historic examples as interpreted and applied by the author. Classification dictated a certain degree of restraint. The situations discussed will be associated with one of the six strategic cases of Swiss Security Policy mentioned in chapter 3. Because these strategic cases can occur simultaneously or in overlapping fashion, the reader must understand that the present analysis stresses clarity at the occasional risk of over simplification. Each situation is only part of a broader scenario and will be analyzed according to the following pattern:

1. International situation, on
2. Situation in Switzerland, on
3. Security assessment: Threat, impact, options, background,
use of instruments of Security policy.
4. Conclusions.

General Defense in the State of Relative Peace (Normal Case)

International situation during January/February 1980.

1. There is no need to invent this scenario; one needs only to select from the day-to-day news of international events.

December 1979: NATO announces the decision to counter the threat caused by the Soviet SS-20 missile by stationing in the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands nuclear warheads to be delivered by PERSHING II medium range missiles capable of reaching the Soviet mainland.

January 1980: The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan with an estimated 50,000 troops to secure the sympathetic Kabul regime gained in 1978. An outraged world opinion condemns Soviet aggression almost with unanimity. U.S. President James E. Carter draws the line of vital U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region and imposes an embargo on exports of grain and sophisticated technology to the U.S.S.R. He further supports an international boycott of the Olympic Games of summer 1980 in Moscow. He asks U.S. allies and other friendly nations to demonstrate solidarity. The situation concerning American hostages in the U.S. Embassy in Teheran has remained unchanged since November 4,

1979. The presence of Soviet troops at the Afghan-Iranian border complicates the situation in Iran at the climax of an irrational revolution.

2. Situation in Switzerland during January/February 1980.

Public reactions against the Soviet invasion is strong. Newspapers reflect more and more concern about European solidarity and dependency on foreign raw materials. The Swiss weekly magazine Die Weltwoche headlines a frontpage editorial, "Neutrality without Oil?"³

The Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs declares its decision to support the upcoming meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe scheduled for November 1980 in Madrid (Spain), in spite of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As planned, the four neutrals, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Finland, will meet in March 1980 to prepare for the Madrid meeting.⁴

The Federal Council publishes the Guidelines of Governmental Policy for 1980-1983.⁵ In foreign policy the government stresses its intention to make Switzerland a full member of the United Nations and to increase governmental aid to third world countries from the present 0.2 percent to 0.31 percent of the gross national product in 1983. At the same time, constraints caused by attempts to balance the budget force a reduction in defense spending (again) from 8.8 billion Swiss Francs to 7.6 billion.

The results of a poll on Swiss public opinion about a boycott of the USSR in the wake of Afghanistan reflect strong feelings against every form of aggression:⁶

The poll has assumed the following form:

Question: There are several schools of thought concerning the measures that should be taken by Americans and Europeans after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Which do you support?

Answers:

Do nothing, is not the concern of the West	15 %
Intervene through U.N. and similar institutions	29 %
Trade embargo according to President Carter's announcement	24 %
Total economic and political boycott	12 %
More active support for Afghan rebels against Russians	8 %
Direct military intervention	2 %
Don't know/no answer	10 %

These results indicate that there is no neutrality of conscience in Switzerland. Seventy five percent of the population favor counter-measures, while 46 percent support countermeasures in concert with those of the United States or stronger.

Another area of concern and attentive observation is a projected change of leadership in Yugoslavia. Will a successor government be able to keep this heterogeneous country together? Generally, the mood in Switzerland during this period of international crisis seems to support the contention that there is no reason not to conduct business as usual.

3. Security Assessment

Since strategists generally agree that security problems have become so interdependent and complicated⁷ that it is impossible to solve them on a single nation basis, it is necessary to assess the European scene before analyzing Swiss security in further detail. In its intermediate report on the Security Policy of Switzerland published in January 1980, the Federal Council states that the strategic situation of Switzerland is determined by⁸

- the international situation
- military and economic threat
- espionage, international terrorism and subversion

The international climate is decisively influenced by relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the bipolar world has become a multipolar one. Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. can serve as the world's policeman. The hostage crisis in Iran is a drastic example of disregard for a superpower by an irresponsible government. Events like the Iran crisis are to some extent the result of a general reluctance to use power in the western world. Obviously, there is a contrast between the threat caused by a traditional east-west confrontation involving weapons systems of unprecedented magnitude, and unrest and adventurism in other areas of the world beyond superpower control. The military threat faced by the world today can be ranked according to three orders of magnitude:

1. A nuclear war is doubtless the most dangerous and devastating threat we face.

2. Because of the direct confrontation of the two superpowers and the accumulation of unprecedented military strength, war in Europe has to be ranked at least number two.

3. The struggle for the control of raw materials and conflicts resulting from political, social, and economic instability in third world areas of strategic importance have to be ranked third.

These categories of threat, however, have to be seen within the perspective of the current political situation. Which category of threat is the most probable?

1. Nuclear war is the least probable because nobody could win, provided the two superpowers keep an equal balance.

2. War in Europe cannot be excluded just because it has not occurred in the last 35 years. But, if the political situation in Europe does not change dramatically, it is possible that the military strength of the two alliances can fulfill their function of deterrence.

3. The struggle for the control of raw material and seaways and consequently third world conflicts are the most probable. They are happening today. The danger that such conflicts can spread and then escalate into larger conflict is real. The scenario in General Hackett's book The Third World War is a vivid example.⁹

The world economy is increasingly characterized by insecurity and instability.¹⁰ Every country faces the threat of being denied important raw materials. Since 1973, when the oil-weapon was used for the first time, economic pressure has become an even more important factor in international security. There are many possible conflicts in

countries of the Middle East, Africa and Asia, many of which control vital raw materials for industrialized nations. Conflicts arising in the oil producing area of the Middle East, for example, would directly affect Europe, including neutral Switzerland.

Western Europe is the second largest industrial zone in the world. But, it depends heavily on imports of vital raw materials. Western Europe imports 75 percent of its raw material compared with 90 percent for Japan and 15 percent for the U.S.¹¹ These figures show that in the future access to vital resources will probably be a major security concern for Western Europe. The U.S. situation is much more comfortable. What complicates the situation further is the fact that the Eastern Bloc is an important exporter of raw material. It is, therefore, understandable why it is much easier for the U.S. to declare economic sanctions against the Soviet Union than it is for western European countries. Switzerland, for example, imports 47 percent of her oil from the west. However, 19 percent is imported from Communist countries and 34 percent from developing nations.¹² The imports from the East help to reduce the dependence on oil from the instable Middle East.

The shifting military balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union is a further major concern for European stability. Military analysts still debate whether the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have reached equality with the United States/NATO or have already surpassed them. There can be no question: the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact far exceed the requirements of a defensive force. The same set of

observations does not apply to the capabilities of NATO. High ranking NATO specialists, like the Belgian General Close, have fundamental doubts about the adequacy of NATO defense.¹³

The nuclear strength of the two alliances has to be estimated more by the second-strike capability than simply by pure numbers of missiles and warheads.

The Soviet deployment of the SS-20 missile in the early 1980's is a decisive advantage. The deployment of the U.S. Pershing II missile in Europe will re-establish the nuclear balance in medium range missiles but not before the mid eighties. The question remains, will the Soviet Union make use of its relative military superiority to pursue a more adventurous policy?¹⁴ Is the invasion of Afghanistan already a symptom of adventurism or is it a police action in support of a communist regime according to the Brezhnev doctrine?¹⁵ The difficulty is that the doctrine can be interpreted either way. East and West speak different languages. After Afghanistan we should redefine terms like detente to avoid further surprise because there is always a certain gray zone open to interpretation. Even those who do not agree that the major goal of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a first step towards the vital oil rich Persian Gulf region have to concede that for the first time since World War II the Soviet Union intervened with military force outside the traditional sphere of interest. An extensive application of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Europe would, therefore, theoretically be applied to countries like Yugoslavia and even Italy calling for "brotherly" help after a Communist takeover.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Report of the Federal Council on the Security Policy of Switzerland emphasizes that during the "normal case," in a situation of serious danger, "interventions by the authorities must be exclusively based on the constitution and on the existing legal order. The principles of proportionality are to be applied with particular care."¹⁶

The existence of a situation of "serious danger" for Switzerland can be denied in this situation. Doubtless, the crisis represents a threat on the global level, which means it is out of reach for a small country like Switzerland. However, Swiss security is affected in several respects:

- Switzerland's and Western Europe's economic interests in the oil-producing Persian Gulf region are vital. These interests mean that open conflict has to be avoided and the seaways must stay open. There are several options: Do nothing, a small country has no influence, or engage the renowned Swiss diplomacy for offices and as a mediator while consulting with the European Community, or keep enough stock to be independent of oil supplies for several months.

- The holding of the U.S. hostages in Teheran affects the principle of diplomatic immunity worldwide and is not limited to the United States. Options: Do nothing, the situation in Teheran is an exception; there is not much you can do against terrorist actions like these, or, improve protection of embassies and be ready to provide offices if required by either the United States or Iran.

- Soviet adventurism as shown in Afghanistan is dangerous to world peace and runs against the peacekeeping tradition of Switzerland.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

If we consider possible instability caused by Euro-Communists in Europe, such a case of precedence of extensive application of the Brezhnev Doctrine has to be discouraged.

Options:

- Diplomatic condemnation of aggression.
- Freeze diplomatic, economic and cultural contacts.
- Join measures taken by other members of the European Community
- Boycott Olympic Games.

- NATO's decision to deploy nuclear medium range missiles, Pershing II, has a correcting impact on the strategic balance and improves deterrent value of NATO military strength. But, NATO deployment increases the danger to Western Europe of becoming a regional nuclear battlefield.

Options:

- Do nothing; continue efforts in civil defense and ascertain whether the army's concept of defense is still adequate in case of increased nuclear threat.
- Continue efforts for arms control.

4. Conclusions

In summary we can conclude that Switzerland is in no way an island of security in a Europe of confrontation. The traditional parochialism of the western European nations cannot conceal the fact that they have already gone a long way towards unification. The organizations of the European community are of growing importance and

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL~~

impact on all western European countries. Whatever threatens the flow of raw materials into the industrialized area of western Europe also threatens Switzerland.

As we have seen, European security can be considered as a carefully balanced system consisting of NATO-bound, neutral, and nonaligned countries. The kind of commitment of each state is largely determined by its heritage and by its geographical location. However, the pure existence of the oversized Soviet war potential creates a common European threat. Any long term military assessment must consider the possible use of these armed forces, perhaps in a changed political climate. It would be shortsighted to accept only today's probable interest of the Soviet government in avoiding a major war. Could Switzerland again stay neutral in a future European War? If the answer is yes, what are the limits? This question will be discussed in chapter five.

But, prior to that, I would like to stress that the main effort of Swiss security policy has to take place during peacetime. It has to be visible and credible during peace in order to be effective during crisis and/or threat. Security policy cannot be separated from the daily routine of bodies responsible for decisionmaking. The most important instrument to be used in this situation is foreign policy. Since the United Nations forms an important platform, it is definitely a disadvantage not to be a full member and not to be able to raise a voice within this world community. Within the context of these

~~TOP SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL~~

considerations, all the justified critiques of the United Nations concerning inefficiency and lack of impartiality are of secondary importance. It is not in the Swiss national interest to take spectacular and dramatic steps in this situation. More important is the silent and professional work of Swiss diplomacy and organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (which is independent of governmental influence). Still, in the eyes of the majority of the Swiss the Swiss Government has the moral obligation to condemn officially any form of aggression and to show solidarity with the free world.

The other instruments of security policy, including the armed forces, civil defense, and war economy preparations, have to be kept in a high state of readiness because the world situation has reached a high degree of instability. The proposal of the Swiss government to cut defense spending again has to be considered carefully by decision-making bodies in Switzerland.

State of Increased Tensions or Serious Disorders (Crisis Case)

One of the characteristics of our technological civilization is its vulnerability. Any country at any time can become involved in a crisis as:

- energy shortage is interrupted because of disruptions in oil production or transportation and/or other economic shortfalls.
- terrorist blackmail (i.e., hostages, hijacking, seizure of a nuclear plant).

- [REDACTED]
- terrorist actions against vital installations of the infrastructure (i.e., communications, water, energy).
 - a combination of subversion and terrorism resulting in serious disorder.
 - natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, etc.).

For the purpose of this study it is more instructive to assess a situation involving a military threat that could escalate through all strategic cases. I prefer to confront Swiss security policy with an existing scenario rather than to invent it. Chapter nine of General Sir John Hackett's The Third World War, "The Invasion of Yugoslavia" suits the purpose.

1. International situation, end of July 1985.

Chronology of a crisis.¹⁷

Early July: - Disorders in Yugoslavia. A pro-Soviet insurgent government calls for Soviet help.

- Two major Soviet maneuvers begin: one in Hungary and a second one of unprecedented size in East Germany.

27 July: - Soviets invade Yugoslavia with an airborne division and a motorized rifle division. They control the area of Belgrade.

28 July: - NATO led by the United States reacts: U.S. Marines and airborne forces make unopposed landings on the Adriatic coast of Yugoslavia.

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- 29 July: - U.S. forces reach Zagreb. Soviet troops withdraw after heavy fighting.
- 30 July: - Soviet and U.S. forces hold their positions and evidently try to avoid further direct confrontation. The fighting of Yugoslavian forces goes on. The U.S. Government calls for an urgent meeting of the Security Council which is scheduled for the afternoon.

2. Situation in Switzerland, July 30, 1985 morning.

A concerned public observed the events in Yugoslavia with anxiety. Many people had listened to the Yugoslav shortwave radio during the night just as they did during the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The morning radio news had informed the public about the Soviet-American fighting. The information was still unconfirmed, but fighting seemed to be more episodic than continuous. The Federal Council had formed a crisis staff to react quickly according to the needs of the unfolding situation.

3. Security Assessment.

Let us assume that at this point all parties involved do everything possible not to allay the momentum of escalation. The fact that the two superpowers are involved in direct military operations against each other is the most dangerous aspect of the situation. For years Soviets and Americans have been careful to avoid such confrontations.

Let us review the meaning of what really happened in Yugoslavia. From the Soviet point of view the invasion of Yugoslavia

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

is nothing but an implementation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The situation is similar to Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1980. The Soviets never made it a secret that the struggle for world domination would continue with all means except military force. The mission of the Soviet Army has been clearly stated, "to defend socialist gains" and "to stand guard over socialism side by side with servicemen of the fraternal armies of countries of the socialist community."¹⁸

From the western point of view this interpretation of the Brezhnev Doctrine was not acceptable. Furthermore, the presence of Soviet troops would dangerously change the balance of power to the disadvantage of NATO's precarious southern flank. So, NATO reacted with amazing swiftness this time to avoid a fait accompli in Yugoslavia.

This of course brought the world to the brink of war. Much depends now on the reaction of world public opinion and on the United Nations. Insecurity also stems from the huge Warsaw Pact maneuvers in East Germany. They could have been scheduled for two reasons. Either the Soviets wanted to conceal their operation in Yugoslavia and contain the NATO forces stationed in the center, or the Soviets are willing to risk using the opportunity to break the western alliance system by conducting a limited attack against the Federal Republic of Germany.

For Switzerland the following considerations will be essential. The Swiss government has to make very clear that:

- The Swiss dedication to neutrality in case of open conflict has not changed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- The Swiss are willing to fight for their independence. Everybody has to be reminded that the price of entrance into Switzerland will be too high.

- Switzerland will do everything within her power to resolve the conflict. Switzerland traditionally maintains close ties with Yugoslavia. According to the Swiss humanitarian tradition, the country will be open for refugees.

Options other than foreign policy for use as instruments of Swiss security policy include:

Readiness of the Swiss Army:

Switzerland is capable of mobilizing its militia army within 24-48 hours. The mechanized units are combat-ready after mobilization; however, a major part of the Swiss militia consists of infantry units which need a few days to prepare for combat. The level of training is high, notwithstanding the short time of instruction available. After a four months' basic training, the soldier trains every year for three weeks with his unit until he reaches age 32, when he is assigned to the Landwehr and later Landsturm formations with shorter training periods. The emphasis is on live-fire training up to battalion level combined-arms exercises. The training time for cadres is much longer of course.

Forces that can be considered as rapid deployable:

- Some regiments doing their refresher training.
 - 15,000 recruits organized into basic training schools of battalion size.
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Since the majority of the Swiss Army needs time to prepare for defense, an early decision for mobilization is crucial. This international situation might at anytime escalate into a European war. At the same time, the decision to mobilize has to be considered carefully because the Swiss army represents a major part of the working population, the absence of which would cause serious problems for Swiss economy and industry.

Options:

- Do nothing, let intelligence and foreign policy do the work.
- Increase the alert level of the army.
- Mobilize parts of the army to facilitate full mobilization should the time come.

Similar considerations are applicable to the civil defense organization.

4. Conclusions.

In a crisis case like the foregoing, a deliberate effort to preserve peace is very important. The more active and constructive the foreign policy in peacetime, the better the chance to be effective in case of crisis. The use of the warning time for mobilization of army and civil defense is of crucial importance. The difficulty with this situation is that it can develop in either directions, peaceful negotiations or escalation into a major armed conflict. Furthermore, it is imperative that a small country demonstrates unequivocally at an early stage the determination to stay neutral and to fight for independence. Foreigners do not usually react strongly against neutrality

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

in peacetime discussions, but hostilities may change the conceptions of others drastically. Yugoslavia in this case study has a weak government with little internal unity. A neutral state located between the interests of two powerful alliance systems cannot afford this. It was the instability of Yugoslavia which attracted the unwanted attention of the Warsaw Pact with attendant NATO reaction. If Yugoslavia's armed forces had been ready to impose a high toll, there would have been a good chance of deterring the intervention. This point should be axiomatic for neutral states.

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER IV

ENDNOTES

¹John Hackett, The Third World War, New York, Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1978.

²Close, Robert, Europe Without Defense, Pergamon Press Inc., Elmsford, NY, 1979.

³De Weck, Roger, "Neutralitaet ohne Erdoel," Die Weltwoche, January 30, 1980, No. 5, p. 1.

⁴_____, Wochenausgabe fuer das Ausland, Tages Anzeiger, February 5, 1980, p. 3.

⁵_____, Wochenausgabe fuer das Ausland, Tages Anzeiger, February 12, 1980, p. 5.

⁶"Boykott der UdSSR?" Die Weltwoche, February 13, 1980, No. 7, p. 3.

⁷Gustav Daeniker, Das Bedrohungsspektrum, Schweizer Monatshefte, January 1980, No. 1, p. 52.

⁸_____, Wochenausgabe fuer das Ausland, Tages Anzeiger, February 5, 1980, p. 3.

⁹General Sir John Hackett, The Third World War, New York, 1978.

¹⁰_____, Wochenausgabe fuer das Ausland, Tages Anzeiger, February 5, 1980, p. 3.


¹¹"Westeuropa am Rohstoff-Gaengelband," Weltwoche, No. 9, February 27, 1980.

¹²Ibid., p. 11.

¹³General Robert Close, Europe Without Defense? Pergamon Press Inc., 1979, p. 29 ff.


¹⁴Harold Brown, The Price of Power, Time, October 29, 1979, p. 27.

¹⁵"Big Stick, Small Carrot: Gromyko leads Moscow's tough-talking peace offensive," Time, May 5, 1980, p. 46.


¹⁶Zentralstelle fuer Gesamtverteidigung, General Defense,
Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the security
of Switzerland of June 27, 1973.

¹⁷General Sir John Hackett, The Third World War, New York,
Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1978, pp. 91-96.

¹⁸N. Ogarkov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Soviet Military
Review No. 10, 1979, pp. 8-11. The "Soviet Military Threat" - Myth or
Reality (reprinted from Prawda).



[REDACTED]

CHAPTER V

FROM OPEN CONFLICTS IN EUROPE TO MILITARY OPERATIONS

IN SWITZERLAND


Open Conflicts in Europe (Neutrality Protection Case)

1. International Situation, 12 August 1985.

Chronology of the escalation of a crisis.¹

- 27 July: - Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia (chapter 4)
 countered by deployment of U.S. Marines and
 airborne troops.
- 30 July: - General mobilization in western Europe in-
 cluding neutral Switzerland, Austria and
 Sweden.²
- 4 August: - Launch of a wide-scale Warsaw Pact attack
 against NATO Center. Violation of neutral
 Austria by a army-sized force thrusting through
 the Danube Valley (Map 2).
- 8 August: - Collapse of the Italian government. Declara-
 tion of a Peoples Republic by a provisional
 government.
- 12 August: - Warsaw Pact main attack reaches Rhine River in
 the north, loses momentum in the center and
 breaks through with a unit of at least division
 strength in the south in the direction of Lake
 Constance on the Swiss-German border (Map 3).
- [REDACTED]

Map 2



Source: General Sir John Hackett, The Third World War, page 151.

Map 3



Source: General Sir John Hackett, The Third World War, page 170.


- Unrest in northern Italy develops towards a civil war. Fighting close to the Swiss border.
- The unrest in the Persian Gulf region in combination with the war in Europe has interrupted the oil flow completely.

2. Situation in Switzerland on 12 August 1985.

Rapid deterioration of the international climate transformed the public mood of anxiety to one of firm determination. The Federal Council reacted promptly to the growing crisis and implemented in rapid sequence package after package of planned measures, many of them established procedures.

On the 1st of August general war mobilization was ordered and the Federal Assembly elected the "General", the commander in chief of all Swiss Armed Forces. In spite of various terrorist and sabotage actions intended to disrupt and lengthen the mobilization process, the general war mobilization for most units proceeded in much the same manner as taught every year in refresher training.

In a move reminiscent of the outbreak of World War II in 1939³ the Federal Council passed a formal declaration of neutrality to most of the countries represented in the United Nations. Overflights of NATO airplanes over Swiss territory led to serious diplomatic protests by the Swiss Government in several NATO capitals. Six American and two German pilots were forced to land on Swiss airfields before being interned according to international law (map 4).⁴ The destruction of two American fighters on 9 August by Swiss Bloodhound missiles over

Map 4Bombings of Switzerland during World War II: 1939-1945

- high-explosive or incendiary bombs
- high-explosive and incendiary bombs
- △ air-gun or foreign air-defense effect
- ✚ crash

Source: Sicherheitspolitik und Armee; Eine Dokumentation Verlag Huber Frauenfeld, 1976, p. 63.

[REDACTED]

Swiss airspace provoked heavy discussion among the Swiss. Was it reasonable to fight the party most Swiss hoped to succeed in the struggle against a brutal aggressor? However, the nearly unanimous feeling was that neutrality was only valid if applied with impartiality. NATO use of Swiss territory could create a "casus belli" for the Warsaw Pact and thereby jeopardize the whole emphasis of Swiss security policy on avoiding war through defense readiness.

The situation on the Swiss-Italian border was growing into a difficult problem. Thousands of refugees blocked the highways leading into Switzerland. The Federal Council had reinforced the border police with army units. Three times in the last two days Italian armed units engaged in the civil war-like fighting in northern Italy tried to cross Swiss territory in the course of local actions. On one occasion the unit returned to Italy after a warning of a Swiss border patrol. Another Italian unit was interned according to international law of neutrality after entering Swiss territory. A third case ended in severe fighting between a Swiss border protection unit and an Italian company which withdrew into Italy after heavy losses.

The violation of Austrian neutrality has again raised the question of the strategic importance of the alpine barrier between NATO Center and NATO South. When the allied powers in Europe had recognized neutral Austria in 1955 they gave their consent to a 850 kilometer long alpine corridor extending from the Czech-Hungarian border right into the southeastern flank of France. An analysis of alpine corridor's terrain reveals three characteristics:

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

a. The alpine barrier consisting of Austria and Switzerland cuts NATO Center and NATO South in half, thereby causing difficulties for troop movements and communications between the two commands. In 1955, when neutral Austria was created, France was still a full member of NATO, and the price to NATO was therefore acceptable (Map 5). From the viewpoint of the Warsaw Pact it was certainly desirable to neutralize eastern Austria which penetrates like a spearhead 200 kilometers into the Iron Curtain. Furthermore, the neutral alpine barrier conveniently protected the southern flank in case of an attack against NATO Center.⁵

b. Austria and Switzerland do not share major common avenues of approach on an east-west axis. In Austria, the most important avenue of approach leads from the Vienna basin up the Danube valley into Bavaria. This approach does not affect Switzerland. The only highway of some importance connecting the two alpine countries is the Arlberg leading from Innsbruck into the Swiss Rhine valley. This avenue of approach, however, is dominated by mountainous terrain and could be easily defended by a small military force. In Switzerland, the main avenue of approach leads from the northeastern border with Germany across the Swiss Plateau parallel to the Alps and then directly into the heart of France. The Swiss Plateau is limited in the north by the Jura mountains and in the south by the Alps. The heavily-forested and hilly terrain, the densely built-up areas, and the many steep river valleys leading from south to north canalize an attacker from either direction, thus favoring defense (Map 6).

[REDACTED]

MAP 5The Alpine Barrier of Switzerland and Austria

MAP 6Geophysical Regions of Switzerland

- a - The Alps are the geological foundation of Switzerland. They consist of granite, gneiss, crystalline strata and limestone.
- b - The Swiss Plateau was originally a sea. Depositions of conglomerate, sandstone and marl strata have formed here.
- c - The Jura is, geologically considered, a result of the folding of the Alps; it consists chiefly of calcareous formations.


Source: Switzerland; Coordinating Committee for the Presence of Switzerland abroad, Conzett & Huber Ltd., 1978.

c. The territory of Austria and Switzerland does not favor ground warfare, and with several exceptions, deserves the appellation alpine barrier. However, the air space could become an alpine corridor. On the one hand, Warsaw Pact forces might be tempted to use this corridor to accomplish a deep penetration with bomber formations into the rear of NATO defenses. For NATO, on the other hand, the narrow corridor would permit a shift in air assets or air-lifted troops and equipment between NATO Center and NATO South.


In summary, we can say that the territory of the two alpine neutrals is not of primary importance in a possible European scenario, at least for land-bound forces. Since the alpine barrier is not a geographical unit, Switzerland and Austria have had to develop different defense conceptions. A major consideration in both cases has to be the fact that the most densely populated and industrialized parts lie outside the Alps. Austria's Vienna basin and Danube valley and the Swiss Plateau represent the heartland of the two countries and are at the same time avenues of approach to be considered in an east-west scenario. Both avenues either invite an Eastern attacker to operate against the southern flank of NATO Center or force NATO to take preventive measures for flank protection if the avenues are not reliably and adequately defended. Neutrality without a credible defense capability would be of little value and would instead create a situation of military insecurity that probably would force either NATO or the Warsaw Pact or both to act (Map 7 and 8).⁶

MAPS 7 and 8Interest of Switzerland's Neutral Territory for Warsaw Pact and NATO

a - Flank operation through Switzerland East-West or West-East



b - Communications and movement of forces between North and South



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Swiss Army has used the time since mobilization for combat preparations and training. The Commander in Chief chose one of the preplanned and rehearsed dispositions with only minor changes to gain time to prepare for combat. One of the obvious advantages of this solution is familiarity with the terrain down to the level of the single soldier. The Army's mission as formulated in the Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the security policy of Switzerland is unchanged:⁷ To dissuade a potential enemy from aggression through defense readiness.

"In case Switzerland is involved in a military conflict: the army will defend the territory starting at the border; it will prevent the opponent from reaching his operational objectives; it will preserve Swiss sovereignty over at least part of our territory."


To fulfill these objectives, the Army is deployed as follows: Three Field Army Corps consisting of one mechanized division, two infantry divisions and several combat brigades echeloned over the Swiss Plateau; One Mountain Army Corps consisting of three mountain infantry divisions and several combat brigades in heavily fortified zones; and Air Force (Maps 9 and 10).

The Swiss Army's concept of defense can be characterized as follows: A potential enemy will be worn down in attacking countless strongpoints and barriers and in repulsing counterattacks springing from every defense favorable spot in the whole country. The concept of combined arms tactics can best be described as a spider's web utilizing


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAPS 9 and 10Zones of the Swiss Army Corps

a - The three Field Army Corps deployed in the Swiss Plateau



b - While the Field Army Corps fight primarily from strongpoints and barricades echeloned over the Swiss Plateau, the Mountain Army Corps builds its defense around fortified zones



Source: Sicherheitspolitik und Armee, Eine Dokumentation, Verlag Huber Frauenfeld, 1976, p. 113.

the infantry's antitank fire and close combat ability and drawing support strength from artillery in canalizing terrain. Like an insect the mechanized enemy will entangle himself in the web of a static defense. Then, mechanized counterattack units, the spider, will kill the intruder once he is entangled. Since a modern army possesses superiority of forces and sophisticated weaponry, he will, after heavy losses, probably break the spider's web. However, the enemy will encounter the next spider's web in a short distance and the procedure as described will repeat itself again and again until the momentum of attack is lost. The best ally of the Swiss Army is terrain. Most Swiss terrain canalizes a mechanized attack. It is difficult to find avenues of approach even for a battalion-size force. The defender's webs will be skillfully located in key areas which cannot be bypassed and which facilitate creating local superiority of force in favor of the defense. The difficult terrain will be reinforced by various obstacles and minefields impeding the movement of an enemy. Moreover, thousands of bridges, tunnels, and highways in narrow valleys have already been constructed in a manner to facilitate rapid demolition.

A recent study of the attrition rate against a modern mechanized enemy assumes for planning purposes that the majority of the Swiss Air Force will receive an anti-tank mission in the area of the Swiss Plateau and that in the worst case the operational area of a Swiss field army corps attacked by six hostile mechanized or armored divisions could theoretically be penetrated after a certain time. The results are encouraging: all of the enemy's employed 24 mechanized or

armored regiments would suffer losses ranging from 60 percent to 75 percent and, therefore, become useless in any continuation of the attack. If we consider that two more field army corps remain in the Swiss Plateau and that, for reasons discussed earlier, no enemy could reasonably make his main attack through Switzerland, the Swiss concept of defense has a good prospect of success.⁸

3. Security Assessment.

The situation in the European theater has reached a critical stage for NATO. The North German Plain and the Netherlands have fallen under Warsaw Pact control. The seaport of Rotterdam is lost, and the seaport of Anvers is in great danger. Both are logistical lifelines for NATO forces in the Central Region. Even more dangerous is the Warsaw Pact's option to turn the attack south, up the valley of the Rhine, in an attempt to encircle the remaining forces of NATO Northern Army Group and NATO Center Army Group. An added threat emanates from the south, where Warsaw Pact forces, rather unexpectedly have succeeded in penetrating the defense of the II German Corps and are drawing close to the Swiss border. A possible link-up of the Northern and Southern pincers is no doubt under consideration at Warsaw Pact Headquarters. Any attempt to reach the Rhine valley north of Basel would require considerable forces to retain attacking momentum. Terrain in the Black Forest, furthermore, is rugged and favors defense. The likeliest avenue of approach to Basel leads through the Swiss and German upper Rhine valley. This approach has the disadvantage of being rather narrow, and therefore, attention is once again riveted on the Swiss Plateau. For

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATO the situation has degenerated to the point at which employing nuclear weapons becomes a serious option. Tactical nuclear weapons could stabilize the situation in the north and/or restore the defense of II German Corps in the south along the Lech river. Should this be impossible, tactical nuclear weapons would be of use in blocking avenues of approach leading through the hilly Black Forest and into the upper Rhine valley (Map 11). Resort to theater or strategic nuclear weapons is a decision of tremendous political consequence. The option exists of using them to back an ultimatum against the Warsaw Pact to force the Soviets to abandon their attack. However, the hour is already late. Intelligence reports indicate that the Warsaw Pact operation seems to be limited by the Rhine river.

Swiss considerations and options:

Condition 1


- The Warsaw Pact did not respect Austrian neutrality in General Sir John Hackett's scenario. If military interest requires use of Swiss territory, then neither will Swiss neutrality be respected.
Option: Swiss opposition must be so strong that hostile operations in Switzerland become too expensive to justify the effort.

Condition 2

- Main attack on German side of Rhine valley and Black Forest.
Local violations of Swiss territory probable because of complicated territorial situation along the border.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Operation through Switzerland against NATO Center's Flank
in expansion of General Sir John Hackett's scenario: The Third World War



Options:

- a. Deploy minimum force strength in the upper Rhine valley. Enforce respect for Swiss territory with negotiations and if necessary by force within the capabilities of border protection units. This option might encourage NATO to use tactical nuclear weapons.
- b. Reinforce the Canton of Schaffhausen (north of the river Rhine) and the upper Rhine valley with strong forces. This option has the advantage of giving real credibility to neutrality. However, redeployment of major units would open a gap somewhere else.

Condition 3

- Main attack through upper Rhine valley and Swiss Plateau, by-passing the Black Forest.

Option: Strategic defense case, do nothing, the Swiss are ready for that case.

Condition 4

- Main attack through upper Rhine valley and Swiss Plateau with the assistance of nuclear blackmail.

Options:

a. Strategic defense case, reject ultimatum. Civil defense organization provides a nuclear shelter for everybody. Therefore, losses could be limited.

b. Accept ultimatum and let Warsaw Pact use Swiss territorium.

Switzerland would become an accomplice or at least a client state of the Warsaw Pact. NATO could be forced to block avenues of approach through Switzerland with nuclear or conventional weapons.

Condition 5

- Preventive occupation of the Swiss side of the upper Rhine valley with NATO forces to establish unity of command and reinforce the defense. This action could possibly be accompanied by the use of tactical nuclear weapons to block avenues of approach leading from the Swiss Plateau through the Jura mountains into the upper Rhine Valley, the NATO defender's southern flank.

Option: Negotiate to prevent this action, and if necessary, resist NATO forces to guarantee the integrity of Swiss territory. Whoever violates Swiss territory becomes the Swiss enemy.

Condition 6

- Nuclear damage as a result of an ultimatum or a preventive action from NATO.

Option: Declare the strategic "Catastrophe Case." Employ the 30,000 men of specialized air-protection units and other troops available to support the civil authorities and the civil defense organization.

4. Conclusions.

Neutrality is credible only if applied with absolute impartiality. Should fighting approach the Swiss border, it is important to demonstrate the will to defend independence. If the general situation is favorable, neutrality could require concentration of superior military strength in an area of lesser tactical importance for dissuasive purposes. Another important point to remember is that the use of neutral territory by one war party calls for counter measures from the other party. Therefore, military concessions or yielding to blackmail

[REDACTED]

would draw the war into the neutral country and, in the case of Switzerland, jeopardize the main thrust of security policy.

The transition point from the Neutrality Protection Case to the Defense Case might be difficult to define. Geographical mistakes, erroneous maps, and even deliberate attempts to gain a local tactical advantage might lead to violations of Swiss neutrality. It is very important to handle such incidents firmly, with demonstrated readiness to intervene militarily. However, care must be exercised in keeping a low profile to prevent overreaction. This cautionary note applies to minor border incidents and violations of Swiss airspace. Deliberate operations aimed at using Swiss territory either for troop movements or for outright occupation definitely constitute an act of war triggering the strategic defense case.

Once Switzerland is deliberately attacked, the policy of neutrality is obsolete. Political leaders would be free of all obligations of international law to choose policies best suiting the Swiss national interest.

Occupation of Parts of the Country (Occupation Case)

1. International Situation.

The scenario dictates that the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy are controlled by Warsaw Pact forces in the Neutrality Protection Case. The U.S. main effort has shifted to the Persian Gulf region. There is no more organized resistance in the European Theater but guerilla warfare sputters on.

[REDACTED]

2. Situation in Switzerland.

The movement of a hostile Combined Arms Army through the Swiss Plateau to outflank NATO Southern Army Group by pushing into the Rhine valley north of Basel proved more costly in time and effort than anticipated. Hostile forces control the eastern part of Switzerland's plateau. The Swiss Army has been able to hold defense positions in the Alpine region and in the western part of the country.

3. Security Assessment.

This new international situation might develop in several directions:

- The war could continue for a long time in other regions of the world before eventually returning to Europe.

- The new status quo could harden sufficiently to serve as a starting point for peace negotiations.

- Events in other area of the world might decisively influence the stalemate in Europe.

For Switzerland the major consideration in this situation is to control as much territory as possible in anticipation of negotiations.

Options:

- a. Continue resistance by means of guerilla warfare in the occupied part of the country. Use every resource to hinder the establishment of a puppet administration.

- b. Cease open resistance in occupied regions to avoid reprisals against the population. Build up a resistance organization ready to act as part of a larger scheme. Use all diplomatic means to avoid partition of the country.

[REDACTED]

Joining the western alliance is not really an option in this scenario because not much of an alliance remains.


4. Conclusions.

The determination to control at least part of the country has an important legal justification. As long as Switzerland exists as a state with an elected government, she will be able to represent herself in eventual peace negotiations. A fully occupied country might be represented by a puppet government. The option to continue resistance with all means might prove effective in the long term. The fact that an occupying force faces longlasting and obstinate resistance in the mountains would in itself be a deterrent. Mountain warfare consumes forces and requires time.

Summary

General Hackett's scenario as applied to this case is of course one of many possibilities. Additional creative thinking could produce a whole catalogue of credible threat situations. However, the given scenario represents threat as perceived by respected western military specialists. What this chapter has attempted to demonstrate is the interdependency of the two components of Swiss Security Policy.⁹

[REDACTED]



The first part is the active contribution to peacekeeping. If it is done in an effective way utilizing the limited capabilities of a small country, it can be dynamic and flexible. However, the other component focuses chiefly on self-preservation, an area requiring constant demonstration of will. Power and the will to use power endow Swiss policy with credibility.

CHAPTER V

ENDNOTES

¹General Sir John Hackett, The Third World War, New York, Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1978.

²In General Hackett's much broader scenario the mobilization of NATO takes place one week earlier.

³Edgar Bonjour, Schweizerische Neutralitaet, Kurzfassung, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel und Stuttgart, 1978, p. 116 ff.

⁴Ibid., p. 149.

⁵General Robert Close, Europe Without Defense? Pergamon Press Inc., Elmsford NY, p. 167.

⁶Dietrich Schindler, Dauernde Neutralitaet, Handbuch der Schweiz Aussenpolitik, p. 180.

⁷Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the security policy of Switzerland (Concept of General Defense) of June 27, 1973, paragraph 424 and 544.

⁸Hans Senn, Korpskommandant, Chief of Staff Swiss Army, Kann die Armee ihren Auftrag erfuellen?, ASMZ (Beilage) Nr. 3/1979, p. 6.

⁹Paul Beurer, Peter Gasser, Ernst Wetter, Sicherheitspolitik und Armee, Verlag Huber, Frauenfeld, 1976, p. 41.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSGeneral

It is evident that in spite of the growing global interdependence, Switzerland is well advised to remain neutral. The sine qua non of neutrality is an independent and effective security policy. Swiss neutrality however, is only one component of Swiss foreign policy and not an end in itself. It primarily has to serve the Swiss national interest. But neutrality also contributes significantly to stability in Europe. Neutral nations are crucial elements in conflict resolution and if neutrals did not exist, they would have to be invented.¹ The advantages of neutrality in the classical tradition by far exceed the disadvantages. Finally, for the time being there is no alternative to a policy which has served so well both the Swiss national interest and the interest of the international community.² Although neutrality has proven to be a viable base for Swiss foreign policy there are some changes that should be considered so as to insure Switzerland can continue to keep maximum independence.

In 1956, during the zenith of the cold war, John Forster Dulles expressed a popular American sentiment when he said that "except under very exceptional circumstances" neutrality is an "immoral and short sighted conception."³ This attitude has since lost ground. But, it remains a factor lurking below the surface in American public opinion. Whenever a "moral" issue arises, neutrality is questioned. A recent

[REDACTED]

example is President James E. Carter's initiative to boycott the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow and then to embargo certain export goods because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As we have seen in this study, this issue has less to do with traditional neutrality than with the decisionmaking process and varying perceptions of governments representing different national interests. This explains why it is so important for Swiss politicians and diplomats to improve the understanding of the Swiss position abroad.

Problems and Constraints

Obviously, Swiss security, like every policy, has to adapt to the changing strategic environment. A number of constraints prompted by international trends influence and limit the freedom of action of a small country. Let us review these constraints and identify some of the problems that might affect Swiss security in the future.

1. One difficult problem stems from the dilemma between independence and the increasing integration of Swiss industry into the European and even global community. Conflicts of interest and pressure from abroad⁴ could impinge on the freedom of action of political authorities. Attempts to arrest or reduce growing integration in favor of independence would sacrifice the prosperity of the Swiss economy and the welfare of the people.⁵ Indeed, it would be difficult to generate national support for such drastic measures. Opinion might change in a case of national emergency. During World War II Switzerland survived for four years by improvising raw materials and using every square meter of arable land for food production.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. Another area of concern comes from new forms of indirect threats to democratic states in peacetime. International terrorism and blackmail often involves the necessity of resorting to coordinated international action. The use of economic weapons to pursue national interests is likely to increase in the future. The only answer for a small country against this threat is to have sufficient stocks of critical raw materials to withstand even a prolonged crisis. Some of these threats are engendered by the ideological confrontation continuing unchanged in spite of detente and "Ostpolitik." Domestically, ideological agitation is aimed mainly against the liberal way of life.⁶ Subversion engineered from abroad to destroy democratic institutions and corresponding freedoms remains a constant factor of national and international life. It is essential to create adequate security instruments to encounter these threats on the international and domestic levels.

3. A third problem area is the need to arm the Swiss militia army with modern equipment according to the requirements of modern technology. This task becomes more difficult because of financial considerations. Autonomy necessitates domestic weapons production. However, this seems to be too expensive, and the Swiss armaments industry is further limited by various other factors. The export of weapons is strictly controlled and limited by the government for reasons of neutrality. Since the Swiss Army alone cannot generate large-scale demand, the domestic armaments industry is hard pressed to become cost

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

effective. A history of unfortunate projects in recent years underscores the fact that the Swiss market is just too small and the costs too high to justify the production of certain sophisticated weapon systems. Another important aspect of the armaments problem is that a militia army requires rugged, simple weapons in large numbers rather than few oversophisticated systems demanding professional operation.

The European neutrals, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden, tried to approach the problem through mutual cooperation. Some success has been attained, but much remains to be done. The creation of a common neutral armament area would in fact enlarge the market and decrease the dependence on other countries.

Are these problems critical enough to raise doubts about the future of the Swiss national goal of freedom in independence and corresponding Swiss security policy? The answer is "No" for the following reasons: These are problems in no way unique to Switzerland. Every industrialized western nation, including the United States, is confronted with the realities of economic interdependence, new forms of threats, and the financial dilemmas of skyrocketing arms costs. Only the scale is different. Second, it is obvious that Switzerland, like every country, has to adjust her policy continuously to remain in consonance with the national interest. Swiss policy has demonstrated its vitality and adaptability for centuries. The Swiss optimistically seek solutions to future problems while remaining loyal to established political values.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Recommendations

1. Switzerland must conduct a more active foreign policy. In spite of the divided public opinion in Switzerland, I am personally convinced that Switzerland must join the United Nations as a full member. The justified doubts in efficiency and impartiality of the United Nations as well as the legalistic argument about surrendering neutrality by joining the world body is no longer valid for six main reasons: First, the examples of Austria and Sweden prove that neutrality and participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations are compatible. Second, for newly independent developing nations, United Nations membership is a symbol of sovereignty. Switzerland's self-isolation is hardly understandable for countries of the third world.⁷ Third, why should Switzerland, already a member of most of the United Nations sub-organizations, bear financial burden without participating in resolving basic issues? Fourth, the history of the United Nations proves that the organization cannot force Switzerland to take action on an issue against her deliberate will. Fifth, some of the new international threats, including terrorism, blackmail, and withholding vital raw materials, can only be countered by international cooperation. Since they affect almost every country, the United Nations might be the appropriate forum in dealing with these problems. Sixth, Switzerland has a tradition of development and contribution to international law. However, an important part of international law today is created within the United Nations. Nonparticipation endangers this important Swiss heritage. The ambiguity of international law is

too well-known to be discussed here, but it is notwithstanding an important source of security for small countries.

2. Switzerland must increase aid to developing nations. As we have seen earlier, the most probable future threat to global security will proceed from the unrest in the Third World. It is in the interest of every industrialized nation to assume an active role in the elimination of the North-South conflict. Even if we consider that the largest part of Swiss aid is at present provided by private organizations and businesses, an official contribution of only 0.2 percent of the gross national product is inappropriate for a rich country like Switzerland. If the principle of solidarity is really one of the guidelines governing the Swiss approach to international relations, it is time to prove it. In my opinion it is overdue for Switzerland to join the World Bank as a member, and to increase considerably the contribution to the International Development Association (IDA). Nonparticipation in international efforts to solve the problems of developing countries will in the long term damage the Swiss image and Swiss security interests in the Third World.

3. Swiss defense spending must be increased in accordance with the degree of threat. As we have seen in the case study, Switzerland's territory and the airspace above it can become an important prize for either side in the event of conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Austria is in a similar situation. Only a strong defense capability gives the country a chance to keep out of war. Swiss defense spending has decreased continually over the past decade both in terms of percentage of the gross national product (1.9 percent in 1979) and in

terms of percentage within Federal Budget (19 percent in 1979).⁷ Maintenance of the Army is increasingly eating up money needed for new weapons systems. We know that the continued military build-up of the Warsaw Pact threatens the present precarious balance, and that NATO plans to improve its defense capabilities decisively by the middle eighties. Switzerland doubtless has the financial potential to meet the military needs for a modern defense force.

These needs will be dictated partially by the decreasing time available for mobilization and combat preparations: the so-called warning time. The Belgian General Close considers a limited Soviet surprise attack against the Federal Republic of Germany successfully conducted during a weekend in summer within 48 hours, the worst case within the reach of possibility.⁸ Consequently the Swiss armed forces must find ways to further reduce the time necessary for combat preparations after mobilization, and continue the emphasis on mechanization to increase mobility. The acquirement of combat-helicopters in this context should be considered. According to the Federal Constitution Switzerland will never have a standing army. However, a further decreasing of the warning time could force her in the future to develop a half-professional type of mechanized multi-purpose combined arms formation kept in a high state of readiness and alert. This would provide a rapid deployment force available immediately after the outbreak of a crisis. There is no need to go into further detail, because it is evident that the permanent adaptation of an army of 620,000 men to the needs of the modern battlefield cannot be achieved without significant financial effort.

[REDACTED]

Final Remarks

If we consider the constraints restricting the freedom of action of any contemporary country, superpower or mediumpower, aligned or neutral, we have to concede that the Swiss security policy with emphasis on neutrality in foreign policy is tailored for Switzerland. No other option could give a small country the same degree of independence while permitting active participation in an interdependent World. It is an irony of history that in today's world of nuclear stalemate, more power does not necessarily mean more freedom of action. Powerful nations have more responsibilities. Therefore, the term independence is relative. The best index of measurement might be the amount of independence enjoyed by the individual and the basic structures of a nation. The Swiss would rank high in this respect but they are notorious for twisting statistics in their favor.

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER VI

ENDNOTES

¹Harold C. Deutsch, Alignment and Neutrality: Europes Future, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, May 1978, p. 5.

²Dietrich Schindler, Dauernde Neutralitaet in Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, Paul Haupt Berne, 1975, p. 180.

³Peter Lyon, Neutralism, Leicester University Press, 1963, p. 47.

⁴Curt Gasteiger, Sicherheitspolitik in Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, Paul Haupt Berne, 1975, p. 217.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Zentralstelle fuer Gesamtverteidigung, Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the security policy of Switzerland of June 27, 1973, paragraph 521.

⁷Alois Riklin, Ist Neutralitaet noch zeitgemaess? in Wende in unserer Sicherheitspolitik, Athenaeum Verlag AG, Lugano, 1978, p. 59.

⁸Hans Senn, Korpskommandant, Chief of Staff Swiss Army, Kann die Armee ihren Auftrag erfuehlen?, ASMZ Beilage zu Nr 3/1979, p. 13 f.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Switzerland's Force Structure

Population: 6,440,000.

Military Service: 17 weeks recruit training followed by reservist refresher training of 3 weeks for 8 out of 12 years for Auszug (age 20-32), 2 weeks for 3 years for Landwehr (33-42), 1 week for 2 years for Landsturm (43-50).

Total armed forces: about 3,500 regular and 15,000 recruits (total mobilizable strength 625,000 within 48 hours).

Estimated GNP 1978: \$83.9 bn.

Defence expenditure 1979: fr3.10 bn (\$1.84 bn).
\$1 = 1.68 francs (1979), 1.88 francs (1978).

Army: 580,000 on mobilization.

War establishment:

3 fd corps, each of 1 armd, 2 inf divs.
1 mountain corps of 3 mountain inf divs.
23 indep bdes (11 frontier, 6 territorial, 3 fortress, 3 redoubt).
Indep units (1 armed car bn, 3 hy arty, 2 engr, 2 sigs regts).
320 Centurion, 150 Pz-61, 370 Pz-68 med tks; 1,250 M-113 APC; 105mm guns; 260 M-109U 155mm SP how; 81mm, 120mm mor; 75mm, 90mm, 105mm ATK guns; 83mm, 106mm RCL Batam ATGW; 10 patrol boats. (On order: 160 Pz-68 med tks, 225 M-113 APC, 207 M-109 155mm SP how, Dragon ATGW.)

Air Force: 45,000 on mobilization (maintenance by civilians); 329 combat aircraft.

7 FB sqns with 100 Venom FB50, 30 F-5E.
9 FGA/interceptor sqns with 140 Hunter F58.
2 interceptor sqns with 33 Mirage IIIS.
1 recce sqn with 18 Mirage IIIRS, 8 Venom FB54 Mk 1R.
7 lt ac sqns with 5 Do-27, 6 Porter, 24 Turbo-Porter, 3 Bonanza ac, 26 Alouette II, 70 Alouette III hel.
Other ac incl 48 Pilatus P-2, 60 P-3, 35 Vampire T55, 3 Mirage IIIBS, 8 Hunter T58, 6 T-5F, 23 FFA C-3605 target tugs.

Sidewinder, AIM 26-B Falcon AAM; AS.30 ASM.

1 para coy.

3 air-base regts.

1 AD bde with 1 SAM regt of 2 bns (each with 32 Bloodhound) and 7 arty regts with 20mm, 35mm, 40mm AA guns.

(On order: 40 F-5E FGA, 45 Skyguard AA systems).

Reserves: Militia 621,500.

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1979-1980

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Alfred Aebi, Der Beitrag neutraler Staaten zur Friedenssicherung
Schriften des Schweizerischen Aufklaerungsdienstes 14, 1976.

Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr, Oran R. Young,
Neutralization and World Politics, Princeton University Press,
1968.

Edgar Bonjour, Swiss Neutrality: It's History and Meaning, London,
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1946.

Edgar Bonjour, Schweizerische Neutralitaet, Kurzfassung, Basel, Helbing
& Lichtenhahn, 1978.

Harold C. Deutsch, Alignment and Neutrality: Europe's Future, Strategic
Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 5 May 1978.

Horst Mendershausen, Territorial Defense in NATO and Non-NATO Europe,
Rand Corp AD-770 609, February 1973.

Nobel Symposium 17, Small States in International Relations, Oslo,
Almqvist & Wiksell Forlag AB, 1971.

Paul Beurer, Peter Gasser, Ernst Wetter, Sicherheitspolitik und Armee,
Eine Dokumentation, Frauenfeld, Verlag Huber, 1976.

General Robert Close, Europe Without Defense? 48 hours that could
change the face of the World, Pergamon Press Inc., New York,
1979.

G. R. Urban, Detente, Radio Free Europe, New York, Universe Books, 1976.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance
1979-1980, London: Bartholomew Press, 1979.

Joseph I. Coffey, Arms Control and European Security, New York,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977.

John M. Collins and Anthony H. Cordesman, Imbalance of Power, Shifting
U.S. - Soviet Military Strengths, Presidio Press, San Rafael,
CA, 1978.

Kurt Furgler, Carl Bjoreman, Otto Niederhauser, Alois Riklin, Ernst
Ruesch, Hans Senn, Emil Spannocchi, Wende in unserer
Sicherheitspolitik? Lugano, Athenaeum Verlag, 1978.

Peter Lyon, Neutralism, Leicester University Press, 1963.

Alois Riklin, Hans Haug, Hans Ch. Binswanger, Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, Bern und Stuttgart, Verlag Haupt, 1975.

Konrad Walter Stamm, Die guten Dienste der Schweiz, Aktive Neutralitaetspolitik zwischen Tradition, Diskussion und Integration, Europaeische Hochschulschriften, Reihe III, Band 44, Bern, Herbert Lang, 1974.

Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, Columbia University Press, New York, 1968.

William L. Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, Bonn/Wien/Zurich, Siegler & Co., KG, 1963.

John Hackett, Sir, General, The Third World War, New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978.

Articles

David E. Bohn, Neutrality - Switzerland's Policy Dilemma: Options in the new Europe, Orbis, Vol 21, Nr 2, Summer 1977, pp. 335-352.

Michael M. Gunther, Switzerland and the United Nations, International Organization, Vol 30, Nr 1, Winter 1976, pp. 129-152.

Dr. Jonathan E. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of Apology, U.S. Bombings of Switzerland during World War II, Air University Review, Vol 28, No. 4, May-June 1977.

Hanspeter Kriesi, Military Service and Social Change in Switzerland, Armed Forces and Society, Vol 2, Nr. 2, Winter 1976.

Ludwig Schulte, Die unbewaeltigte Krise: Alternativmodelle zur NATO-Verteidigung, Beitraege zur Konfliktforschung, 1978, Nr 2, pp. 19-40.

Hans Senn, Korpskommandant, Generalstabschef, Kann die Armee ihren Auftrag erfuehlen?, Beilage zur Allgemeinen Schweizerischen Militaerzeitschrift Nr. 3/1979.

Schweizer Monatshefte fuer Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur, Januar 1980, Westeuropas Sicherheit, pp. 21-59.

_____, "Big Stick, Small Carrot, Gromyko Leads Moscow's Tough Talking
"Peace Offensive," Time, May 5, 1980, p. 46.

and various articles from:

New York Times

Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Zurich, Switzerland

Weltwoche, Zurich, Switzerland

Tages-Anzeiger, Zurich, Wochenausgabe fuer das Ausland

Documents

_____, The Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation
(Unofficial translation)

Federal Minister of Defense, White Paper 1979: The security of the
Federal Republic of Germany and the development of the Federal
Armed Forces, Bonn, 4 September 1979.

Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, Richtlinien der Regierungspolitik
1975-1979, Bern, 1976.

Schweizerischer Aufklaerungsdienst, Grundlagen einer strategischen
Konzeption der Schweiz, Bericht der Studienkommission fuer
strategische Fragen, Schriften des SAD 11, 1971.

Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, Zwischenbericht zur Sicherheitspolitik,
No. 79.085, 3 December 1979, Bern.

Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, Bericht ueber die Richtlinien der
Regierungspolitik in der Legislaturperiode 1979-1983, No.
80.001, 16 January 1980.

Zentralstelle fuer Gesamtverteidigung, General Defense, Report of the
Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the security of
Switzerland of June 27, 1973.

The Department of State, Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe, Final Act, Helsinki, 1975.